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OUTLOOK AND APPRAISAL 
The recession has officially ended with 
a second quarter rise in non-oil Gross 
Domestic Product of 0.1%, the first 
quarterly rise since 1990 Q3. 
Subsequent events in the ERM will 
provide a boost to the real economy but 
recent unemployment figures suggest 
that any significant upturn will be 
delayed until 1993. 
The position of the Scottish economy has changed 
considerably in the last three months. Since the 
second half of last year the short term model has 
been expecting a modest upturn in production in the 
first quarter. Unfortunately, the latest figures from 
the Scottish Office show that this has failed to 
materialise. In the three months to March the total 
index of Production and Construction fell by 1.3% 
compared with the 0.6% decline experienced by the 
United Kingdom. The downturn seems to have been 
most potent in the manufacturing industry. When 
construction and energy & water are stripped out 
the quarterly decline increases to 2.7% compared 
with growth of 0.5% in the U.K. as a whole. Under 
normal circumstances a dramatic downturn of this 
nature would warn of impending gloom and 
hardship. However, these first quarter figures 
immediately precede the UK General Election and 
may not accurately represent the state of the 
Scottish Production and Construction industries. 
Annualized data provide more evidence that the 
recession is stronger south of the border. Over the 
year the total Scottish index fell by 1.0% while the 
UK contracted by 2.6%. The annualized contraction 
in Manufacturing measured at 1.8% is some 2.5% 
less than in the UK Once again Scottish 
construction industry is moving in the opposite 
direction to its UK counterpart. Annualized growth 
of 3.1% in Scotland contrasts with the 8.8% decline 
in the UK 
Scotland's unemployment performance is still 
superior to the UK Total unemployment rose by a 
seasonally adjusted 2700 in August, a rate of 9.6%. 
Since August 1991 the count has risen by 16,000 
although mis month's increase was dampened by a 
decline in female unemployment which fell by 200. 
The UK economy 
The latest available UK statistics give an 
inconsistent picture of the current state of the 
economy. Moreover, the statistics which showed an 
improvement in the last Commentary are now 
included in the 'gloomy' collection. 
Encouragement can be taken from the 0.1% rise in 
non-oil GDP in the first quarter but there are four 
additional indicators which offer good news. Firstly, 
the volume of consumer credit repayments fell 
again in May to a figure of only £19bn, compared 
to the average repayment of £44bn in the preceding 
quarter. Secondly, average earnings have fallen 
dramatically since die beginning of die decade to 
stand at a 12 year low. Annual growth of only 6.0% 
was recorded in June 1992. Thirdly, overall 
industrial production grew by 1.0% in July, mainly 
the result of a substantial increase in energy 
production. Lastly, the decline in real gross fixed 
investment has come to a halt with its first rise 
since early 1990. 
True to current form, though, for every positive 
figure their are counteracting influences on 
perceptions. The latest index of production reveals 
that output of manufactured goods fell by 0.9% in 
the year to July and remained flat over the previous 
three months. This comes after positive growth in 
the first half of the year. The seasonally adjusted 
volume of retail sales fell by 0.3% in July after 
remaining largely unchanged over the previous 
three months, more evidence that the post election 
boom was a knee jerk reaction and had little 
substance. Stockbuilding by manufacturers fell in 
the three months since the last Commentary, 
supplementary evidence that demand is not 
expected to be maintained in the near future. 
The balance of payments deteriorated once again in 
July. Over the year exports rose by 1.5% and 
imports rose by 8%, a disturbing trend given that 
Britain has only just, technically, emerged from 
long recession. One would have expected the 
economy to be well into the upswing of the cycle 
before seeing significant increases in import 
demand. Unemployment increased by a seasonally 
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adjusted 47,000 in August - a rate of 9.9% - and 
represents the second monthly acceleration in the 
count. This will surely halt the fall in the savings 
ratio and dampen consumers' expenditure plans. 
Indeed a recent survey by PA Economic 
Consultants shows that consumer confidence has 
collapsed since the post election euphoria and 
household spending intentions are at a lower level 
than at any time in the past 18 months. 
Crisis in the ERM 
The effective devaluation of Sterling within the 
ERM coupled with the misfortunes of the Italian 
Lira and the Spanish Peseta has more or less 
removed any anti-inflationary credibility that Britain 
commanded from the foreign exchange markets. 
Following decades of successful low inflationary 
growth the Bundesbank acted historically and 
pursued its objective of low German inflation by 
refusing to substantially reduce interest rates when 
weaker ERM currencies, including Sterling, came 
under pressure from speculators. Continued foreign 
exchange intervention would have increased the 
stock of foreign reserves held by the Bundesbank 
and forced German M3 in the opposite direction to 
its own policy objective. In all probability, 
continued German intervention would have resulted 
in increased German interest rates, increased 
European interest rates and a prolonged European 
recession. 
For the currency dealers it plainly became 
impossible to believe in the survival of a UK 
economic policy that seemed to promise a 
perpetuating recession, ever rising unemployment -
up 47,000 in August - and progressive fiscal 
deterioration. In time a reduction in the price of 
Sterling became a formality because from the offset 
the British government did not appear to understand 
the rules of the ERM game. The UK should have 
raised short term interest rates in December 1991 
and in July 1992 - every other ERM member state 
followed Germany monetary policy - as this would 
have signalled complicity. Unwisely, the 
Government boasted its intention of lowering 
interest rates below Germany's and by doing so 
implicitly highlighted the inherent weaknesses in the 
British economy and its structural inability to play 
the credibility game of raising interest rates in 
response to the leader, Germany. As a result, when 
the foreign exchange markets were informed that 
Britain would raise interest rates to any level 
necessary they simply did not believe in Sterling 
and Britain's ability to cope with continued 
recession. So, on September 16, Sterling joined the 
Lira and the government opted to float, rather than 
pushing up interest rates by 5% and crushing the 
real economy. 
Sterling and Britain's anti-inflation policy collapsed 
as a result of insufficient credibility, structural 
weakness and Britain's own insistence that it would 
not join until all member states had abolished their 
own exchange controls. Evidence from the early 
years of the ERM suggest that had exchange 
controls existed the speculative attack on Sterling 
might not have had the momentum to carry it below 
DM2.7780 and ultimately out of the system. 
Outlook 
Macroeconomic policy 
What of Britain's ERM anti-inflationary policy? 
Assuming that Britain's commitment to the ERM is 
genuine and the system survives the referendum in 
France, what options are available to the domestic 
monetary auuiorities. 
The government can boost the real economy by 
lowering interest rates - some say a 4% cut is 
needed for recovery - and then floating with the 
intention rejoining the ERM sometime in the future. 
Unfortunately this renders even more vacuous the 
UK government's promise of,"... no devaluation..," 
and seriously undermines the prospect of regaining 
credibility in the short term. However, the lowering 
of UK rates may deliver a low enough exchange 
rate to convince the market that it has fallen to its 
equilibrium level and remove the likelihood of 
further speculation and the need for dealers to hold 
a risk premium. Rigid adherence to the mechanism 
could then provide low inflationary growth in the 
medium to long run via lower real interest rates. 
Lowering interest rates would have beneficial 
effects in the housing market, stunt the rise in 
unemployment and increase investment intentions. 
A consumer led recovery could then get underway, 
aided by greater export competitiveness. 
Alternatively, Sterling could re-enter the mechanism 
shortly after the French referendum at some level 
which is not considered a devaluation, possibly 
around DM 2.75 / 2.80. This is non-option since 
any attempt to return to the parity from which 
Sterling fell in humiliation would simply introduce 
the probability of a renewed speculative attack 
implying that current high real interest rates would 
be sustained into the medium term with the obvious 
deleterious effects for the real economy. 
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An additional headache is the current state of fiscal 
policy and the excess £14bn spending demands 
from government departments. (The government's 
target is £244.5bn). This has special reference to 
Scotland as the Goshen-Barnett formula (which 
ensures that the Scottish Office receives 10/85s of 
approved expenditure on equivalent English 
programmes) is under threat following a downturn 
in Scotland's population trend relative to the rest of 
the UK. 
The current economic wisdom advises a further 
slackening in monetary policy and fiscal rectitude. 
The combined effect will reduce real interest rates, 
borrowing costs and provide a much needed 
stimulus to the UK economy which will then feed 
into Scotland. 
Prospects for the Scottish economy 
The ERM devaluation and withdrawal will have 
conflicting effects on the future growth of the UK 
and Scottish economies. 
On the one hand, the devaluation will help 
exporters and reduce the value of imports, giving 
the real economy a much needed boost. This effect 
could be greater in Scotland given the greater 
importance of tradeables to the home economy. 
Economic history confirms that eventually increased 
inflationary expectations - via higher raw materials 
prices and wage costs - will erode any competitive 
gain, but given that average earnings have fallen to 
a 12 year low (6%) this is unlikely to occur until 
the medium term when recovery is well under way. 
Conversely, while yields on short term bonds have 
fallen, reflecting the markets belief that interest 
rates can be cut following the float, yields on long 
bonds have risen as future inflation is discounted. 
Rising long term yields will probably result in some 
downward revisions in investment intentions thereby 
crowding out some of the demand stimulus 
provided by a lower exchange rate. This could work 
to the detriment of Scotland given the concentration 
of investment goods in production. 
On the whole, figures for the last three months are 
of little relevance now that policy has changed. The 
events of mid September are likely to have 
beneficial effects for Scotland and the United 
Kingdom as monetary policy, given the lower 
exchange rate, is now much looser than in August 
The appreciation of Sterling vis-a-vis the US dollar 
will improve the profits of North Sea oil traders, 
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given that trade is conducted in US dollars, giving 
a boost to Gross Domestic Product in the fourth 
quarter of this year. The housing market may start 
to recover by the beginning of next year as real 
interest rates fall and house prices begin to increase. 
Our short term model is predicting a year on year 
contraction in production of 1.1% for Scotland in 
1992, a larger figure than most forecasts assume for 
the UK Undoubtedly the events of September 16, 
should reduce this figure to just under 1.0% as 
Scotland is more likely to be one of the first 
regions to emerge from recession given that the 
burden of household debt is much less severe here 
than south of the border, (see Commentary Vol.17 
No.3) 
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